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Bell v. West, 284 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1981)
Bartz v. Wheat, 285 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1982)
Mozingo v. Barnhart, 285 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1981)
In Bell v. West' and Bartz v. Wheat,2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals acknowledged the existence of the family purpose doctrine in West
Virginia. As the court explained in Bartz, "the family purpose doctrine pro-
vides that the owner of a motor vehicle purchased or maintained for the use or
enjoyment of his family is liable for injuries caused by the negligent driving of
that vehicle by any member of his family. ' 3
Bell v. West involved an action by a plaintiff who had been injured by the
alleged negligent operation of a vehicle by the son of the owner of the vehicle.
The plaintiff attempted to bring an action against the father who owned the
vehicle pursuant to the family purpose doctrine. In Bell, the court affirmed, in
a per curiam opinion, the trial court's holding that the family purpose doctrine
did not apply to this case. Consequently, the father who owned the vehicle was
not liable because the son involved in the accident had been living and working
away from his parent's home for over two years and was home only to visit his
family and friends. In so holding, the court stated: "Although the family pur-
pose doctrine is firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of this State, we have
never applied the doctrine to a factual circumstance where the son's relation-
ship to the owner of the car is as attenuated as it is in this case.' The court
went on to declare that the family purpose doctrine has no application where
the child has not been a part of the parent's household for an extended period
of time.
In his dissent, Justice Harshbarger criticized the majority for limiting the
family purpose doctrine unnecessarily. Justice Harshbarger declared: "We
should not look to age, self-sufficiency or residence of the parties-we should
only determine that there is a family car, and that it was used by a family
member with its owner's permission." 5 However, both the majority and the dis-
sent in Bell recognized the continued existence of the family purpose doctrine
in West Virginia.
The court also refused to apply the family purpose doctrine to impute the
contributory negligence of the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle to the plaintiff-
owner. In Bartz v. Wheat,6 the plaintiff's son was riding a motorcycle owned by
1 284 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1981).
2 285 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1982).
3 Id. at 895.
" 284 S.E.2d at 887.
5 Id. at 890.
6 285 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1982).
1
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the plaintiff when the son attempted to pass the automobile in front of him.
While attempting to pass the vehicle in front of him, the plaintiff's son on the
motorcycle was hit when the car in front turned to the left. As a result of the
accident, the son was injured and the motorcycle was virtually destroyed. In
the plaintiff-owner's action to recover for the damages to his motorcycle, the
trial court set aside a jury verdict for the father declaring that the plaintiff was
barred from recovery by his son's contributory negligence under the family
purpose doctrine. After reinstating the jury verdict for the father, the court
stated, "the family purpose doctrine was initially formulated and has been con-
sistently applied to permit a plaintiff to recover from a financially responsible
party, the doctrine should not be used to impute negligence to the owner to
bar his recovery."' 7 Writing for the court, Justice Neely noted that this holding
might seem contrary to previous decisions which compare the family purpose
doctrine to the law of agency. The law of agency would impute the negligence
of the agent to the principal. However, the court distinguished the family pur-
pose doctrine from the law of agency on the grounds that the family purpose
doctrine was established only to improve the chances for financial recovery by
a plaintiff and not to hold the person who benefits from the agent's efforts
accountable for the agent's negligence which is the rationale in agency law.8
The court did not address why the comparative negligence theory estab-
lished in Bradley v. Appalachian Power9 was not applied or what effect, if any,
the comparative negligence theory would have upon the family purpose doc-
trine. However, the language in Bartz indicates that the family purpose doc-
trine could not be used to impute the comparative negligence of the driver of a
plaintiff's vehicle to a plaintiff-owner.
The question of whether a sheriff is still vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of his deputies was answered in the affirmative by the court in Mozingo v.
Barnhart.10 In Mozingo, a Brooke County deputy, while performing a lawful
arrest, drew his pistol, which discharged and killed the plaintiff's decedent.
The trial court held that the sheriff was vicariously liable, even though the
deputy was employed under the civil service system. In affirming the sheriff's
liability, the court noted that liability was not imposed upon the sheriff based
upon a res ipsa loquitur or related theory of law, but because of the sheriff's
failure to fulfill his responsibility to train and supervise his deputies. The facts
disclosed in the trial court indicated that the deputies had been issued pistols
with virtually no training on how or when the pistols were to be used. Due to
this failure to properly train his deputies, the court in Mozingo held the sheriff
vicariously liable for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's decedent.
Id. at 896.
8 Id.
9 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
10 285 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1981).
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II. INSURANCE
Smith v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co., 289 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1982)
Staley v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co., 282 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1981)
Camden Fire Insurance Association v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1982)
In Smith v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co.,11. the court declared that a
written notice of cancellation of a farmer's mutual fire insurance policy must
be actually received by the insured policyholder at least five days prior to the
effective date of cancellation in order to be binding upon the insured. In
Smith, a farmer's mutual insurance company, after discovering that an in-
sured's premises were unoccupied, attempted to cancel the policy by mailing a
notice of cancellation to the address they suspected to be vacant. After a fire
loss occurred a few months later, the trial court found the cancellation to be
ineffective and held the insurance company liable on the policy because the
policyholder did not receive actual written notice of the cancellation five days
before the cancellation was to be effective. In affirming the liability of the in-
surance company, Justice Neely, writing for the court, interpreted the perti-
nent statutes of the West Virginia Code12 to mean that the insured had to
receive actual written notice. The Code states in part, "The company may can-
cel any policy upon at least five days' written notice to the holder."13
In holding that there must be actual written notice to the policyholder for
a cancellation to be effective, the court restricts, if not overrules, the decision
in Laxton v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co.,1 4 which held that the
mailing of the cancellation notice was sufficient to cancel an automobile insur-
ance policy. In Laxton, as in the present case, the insurance policy in question
clearly provided that the mailing of the notice of cancellation would be suffi-
cient proof of such notice. Laxton also held that the automobile insurance pol-
icy had been bargained for by the insurance company and the insured and that
the cancellation provisions were clear and unambiguous and not contrary to
public policy. Justice Neely distinguished Laxton from the present case on the
grounds that (1) there were no West Virginia statutes concerning the cancella-
tion of automobile policies, (2) the court in Laxton considered that the govern-
ment, in its operation of the mails, was the agent of the insured, and (3) the
Laxton court determined that the cancellation provision was bargained for by
the parties.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice McHugh declared that, "[t]he majority
is, in effect, rewriting the policy and amending the statutes."1 5 Justice McHugh
stated that the reasoning of Laxton should have been applied and, since the
insurance company complied with the cancellation provisions of the insurance
policy, the mailing of the notice of cancellation should have been sufficient to
11 289 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1982).
12 W. VA. CODE §§ 33-22-14, 15 (1982).
13 W. VA. CODE § 33-22-15(c) (1982).
14 150 W. Va. 598, 148 S.E.2d 725 (1966), overruled, 289 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1982).
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declare the cancellation effective.16
In another case discussing a notice of cancellation of an insurance policy,
the court stated, "A notice of cancellation of insurance must be clear, definite
and certain ... it must contain such a clear expression of intent to cancel the
policy that the intent to cancel would be apparent to the ordinary person."'7 In
Staley v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co.,18 a notice of cancellation of a fire
insurance policy was held to be insufficient, even though it was actually re-
ceived by the insured, because the notice that the insurance company intended
to cancel the policy was not clear. The cancellation notice in question only
referred to the "non-renewal" of the policy and did not contain either the
words "cancelled" or "cancellation." The insureds were further misled when
they received an invoice for and paid the next year's insurance premium. In
holding the notice of cancellation ineffective, Justice Miller also declared that
"[a]ll ambiguities in the notice will be resolved in favor of the insured.", "
Therefore, based on the holdings in Smith v. Municipal Mutual Insurance
Co. 20 and Staley v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co., 21 in order for a notice of
cancellation of a fire insurance policy to be effective, the fire insurance com-
pany must provide actual written notice of cancellation that is received by the
insured policyholder at least five days prior to its effective date and such notice
of cancellation must be in a form that clearly shows the intent of the insurance
company to cancel the insurance policy.
In another insurance case, the court adopted the majority view that the
term "business pursuits" in an insurance contract means, "a continuous or reg-
ular activity engaged in by the insured for the purpose of earning a profit or
livelihood. ' 22 In Camden Fire Insurance Association v. Johnson,23 an insur-
ance company attempted to avoid payment of a personal injury claim on the
grounds that the insured was engaged in "business pursuits" that excluded the
insured from coverage. In Johnson, the insured was babysitting her grandson
during the day and receiving $80.00 a month from the Department of Welfare
for these services. One day while the grandmother was babysitting the grand-
son, the grandson was injured when he was struck by an automobile. The in-
surance company that provided personal liability coverage under a homeown-
ers policy for the grandmother claimed they were not obligated to defend her
in the action on behalf of the grandson against the grandmother because she
was engaged in business pursuits which expressly excluded her from coverage.
In holding that this babysitting arrangement was not a "business pursuit"
which would exclude coverage under the insured's homeowners policy, the
court said that the determination of whether an activity constitutes a business
16 Id.
17 Staley v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co., 282 S.E.2d 56, 57 (syl. pt. 1) (W. Va. 1981).
Is 282 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1981).
19 Id. at 57 (syl. pt. 1).
20 289 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1982).
21 282 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1981).
22 Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116, 119 (W. Va. 1982).
23 294 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1982).
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pursuit would have to be decide'd on a case-by-case basis.2 4 In Johnson, it was
held that the insured's babysitting was not a business pursuit because she was
not licensed to carry on the activity, did not advertise her babysitting, did not
babysit for anyone other than her grandchildren, and was not always compen-
sated for her babysitting.25
III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981)
Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982)
In Bowman v. Barnes26 the court declared that a plaintiff's contributory
negligence must be compared against the negligence of all the parties involved
in the accident and not just the parties involved in the litigation when apply-
ing the comparative negligence theory established in Bradley v. Appalachian
Power.27 Bowman involved the wrongful death of a plaintiff's decedent who
was killed when a train struck the automobile she was a passenger in at a rail-
road crossing. As a result of this accident, the decedent's administrator
brought a wrongful death action against both the driver of the car she was a
passenger in and the B & 0 Railroad Company. Upon the trial court's own
motion, separate trials of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant railroad
and the defendant car driver were ordered over the objections of both the
plaintiff and the defendant driver. After the jury found that the defendant
railroad had not been negligent, both the plaintiff and the defendant driver
appealed claiming that the trial court wrongfully ordered separate trials. The
court held that the use of separate trials for the defendant railroad and the
defendant driver was error.28 Justice Miller said, "Rule 42(c), R.C.P. . . must
be considered in light of the general policy of our joinder rules .... Such rule
should also be interpreted with regard to our comparative negligence doctrine,
which is designed to compare plaintiff's contributory negligence to the negli-
gence of all parties involved in the accident and litigation."29 Justice Miller
went on to say that the cases are rare where the trial court would be warranted
in ordering separate trials as to joint tortfeasors.30
In Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,31 a woman was killed when the
pick-up truck in which she was a passenger collided with a truck. After the
administrators of the decedent's estate brought a wrongful death action against
the owner of the truck, the defendant truck owner filed a third-party com-
plaint against the driver of the pick-up truck who was the husband of the dece-
dent. The jury found that 70 percent of the negligence was attributable to the
defendant truck owner and the remaining 30 percent of the negligence was
24 Id. at 119.
25 Id. at 120.
26 282 S.E.2d 613, 621 (W. Va. 1982).
27 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
28 282 S.E.2d at 619.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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attributable to the defendant pick-up truck driver. The jury also found dam-
ages for the plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.00, of which $75,000.00 was to
be awarded to the decedent's son and $25,000.00 was to be given to the surviv-
ing husband who was also the third-party defendant.
As a result of this case, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia certified two questions to the supreme court. The
first question involved the issue of whether the third-party complaint against
the decedent's husband was barred by the doctrine of interspousal tort immu-
nity. In response to this question, the supreme court declared that the third-
party action was not barred because the ruling in Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer"2
was to be applied retroactively.
The second question in Sitzes was what effect the adoption of comparative
negligence in West Virginia had upon the rules of contribution among joint
tortfeasors and the distribution of a jury's award of damages pursuant to a
wrongful death action. The court responded to this question by reaffirming this
jurisdiction's commitment to the concept of joint and several liability and de-
claring that the holding in Bradley did not change the right of a plaintiff to
collect the entire amount of a judgment from any joint tortfeasor against whom
the judgment was entered.3 3
As to the issue of contribution, Justice Miller stated:
The basic purpose of the joint and several liability rule is to permit the injured
plaintiff to select and collect the full amount of his damages against one or
more joint tortfeasors. This rule however need not preclude a right of compara-
tive contribution between joint tortfeasors inter se. The purpose of this latter
rule is to require the joint tortfeasors to share in contribution based upon the
degree of fault that each has contributed to the accident.3 4
Consequently, contribution between joint tortfeasors should now be based
upon the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors. Although a plaintiff
may still collect all of a judgment in his favor from any of the joint tortfeasors
against whom the judgment was entered, a defendant who has paid a judgment
has a right to contribution from his joint tortfeasors based upon the joint
tortfeasors' relative degrees of fault.
The decision in Sitzes also held that the defendant truck owner had a
right to contribution from the third-party defendant even though the defen-
dant truck owner was 70 percent negligent because nothing in Bradley35 bears
upon the right of contribution s. 3  Sitzes also held that the third-party defen-
dant, the decedent's husband, could not set-off his $25,000.00 judgment against
his $30,000.00 contribution debt to the defendant truck owner. In so holding,
the court stated: "Generally, parties may set-off on judgments obtained against
32 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978). Coffindaffer abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort im-
munity in West Virginia.
" 289 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 685.
" 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
289 S.E.2d at 689.
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each other. This rule is, however, not a matter of absolute right but subject to
the court's discretion. '37 The supreme court justified the denial of the set-off
in this case by explaining that both parties had adequate insurance and, there-
fore, only the insurance companies would benefit if the set-off was allowed.
IV. STRICT LiBmiTy
Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1982)
In Peneschi v. National Steel Corp.,38 the court formally adopted into the
common law of this jurisdiction the strict liability doctrine established in Ry-
lands v. Fletcher.39 In his majority opinion, Justice Neely explained the basic
principle of Rylands to be, "that where a person chooses to use an abnormally
dangerous instrumentality, he is strictly liable without a showing of negligence
for any injury proximately caused by that instrumentality."' The Rylands
principle adopted is essentially the same as that stated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts."1
In Peneschi, an employee of an independent contractor who had been
hired to install a coke furnace for the National Steel Corporation was injured
when a coke oven battery exploded. In the plaintiff employee's action against
National Steel, the court held that the coke oven was a type of dangerous in-
strumentality that would have imposed tle Rylands-type of strict liability
upon National Steel for injuries to independent third parties. However, the
court ruled that National Steel was not strictly liable to the plaintiff employee
because he was an employee of an independent contractor hired by National
Steel, and, consequently, the plaintiff had assumed the risk. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice McGraw agreed with the majority that assumption of risk
could be a valid defense in a strict liability situation, but criticized the major-
ity for holding that the employee had assumed the risk, as a matter of law,
because of his employer's contract with National Steel.4
The plaintiff employee in Peneschi was also unable to collect from his em-
ployer, the independent contractor, under the theory established in
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries43 because he did not attempt to join his em-
ployer as a defendant until five years after the time of the accident and, there-
fore, he was barred by the statute of limitations. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to in-
clude the independent contractor on the grounds that the plaintiff had been
aware of his cause of action against the independent contractor at the time of
the original action and elected not to assert the claim against his employer.
The denial of this motion prevented the plaintiff from utilizing the "relation
' Id. at 691.
295 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1982).
3' Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H.&C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R.
1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
40 295 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 1982).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1976).
12 295 S.E.2d 1, 16.
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back" provision of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)" to defeat the
bar of the statute of limitations.
Although Peneschi formally adopted the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine of
strict liability into the common law of West Virginia, the court expressly de-
clared that, "this decision in no way alters our decision in Morningstar v.
Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., not to adopt the Rylands doctrine into
our tort product liability law."
'4 5
V. INFORMED CONSENT
Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982)
The issue of informed consent was addressed in Cross v. Trapp.46 In Cross,
the supreme court adopted the "patient need" standard which measures the
duty of the physician to disclose information to the patient by what the physi-
cian knows or should know to be the patient's informational needs in deciding
whether to consent to the proposed treatment. Cross involved an action by a
patient who had part of his prostate gland removed after signing only a general
consent. The patient claimed he did not consent to the prostate operation. In
adopting the patient need standard and finding that the patient had not con-
sented to the prostate operation, the court cited Canterbury v. Spence47 which
stated, "that the topics demanding disclosure by the physician included: (1)
the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatments, (2) the alterna-
tive to that treatment, if any, and (3) the results likely if the patient remains
untreated. 4 8 Cross also recognized that there could be certain emergency situ-
ations where consent could not be obtained and, therefore, would not be re-
quired, but the burden of proof would be upon the treating physician to estab-
lish the circumstances of the emergency situation.
49
VI. Lmm
Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1982)
In Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza,50 an award of $15,000.00 in punitive damages
for libel was reversed by the supreme court because there was no showing of an
intentional or reckless publication of false defamatory material.51 Havalunch
involved a writer for the Daily Athenaeum, the West Virginia University
4 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 15(c) allows an amended pleading to "relate back" to the time of the
original pleading as long as the claim or defense asserted arose out of the same transaction and, if
the amendment involves the joinder of another defendant, that defendant must have been on ade-
quate notice so he would not be unfairly prejudiced and also that defendant must have known or
should have known that, except for a mistake, the defendant would have been a defendant in the
original action.
45 295 S.E.2d at 11 n.9 (citation omitted).
46 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
47 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
48 Id. at 787.
41 294 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W. Va. 1982).
50 294 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1982).
I1 Id. at 73.
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school newspaper, who wrote an article concerning various eating establish-
ments in the Morgantown area. In this article, she wrote a noncomplimentary
paragraph concerning Havalunch, which questioned, in a humorous manner,
the cleanliness of the establishment and the quality of its clientele. Havalunch
brought a libel action against the writer and was awarded $15,000.00 in puni-
tive damages and no compensatory damages. In reversing the award for
Havalunch, the court stated that the article in question was protected under
the doctrine of "fair comment" which is a "form of qualified privilege and com-
ment is 'fair' when based on facts truly stated and free from imputations of
corrupt or dishonorable motives on the part of the person whose conduct is
criticized, and where it is an honest expression of the writer's real opinion or
belief."52 Also, the awarding of punitive damages without a showing of malice
must fail based upon the holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.53 In its hold-
ing, the court adopted the majority rule in this area of the law of defamation as
articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts.54 The court did not address the
issue of whether punitive damages may be properly awarded when the jury
finds no compensatory damages for the plaintiff.
VII. NUISANCE
West v. National Mines Corp., 285 S.E.2d 670 (W. Va. 1981)
In West v. National Mines Corp.,55 the court recognized that property
owners along public roads have a cause of action against someone who negli-
gently uses those public roads. West involved adjoining landowners who
brought action against a coal company for the dust nuisance created by the
coal trucks using the public road. By reversing a decision for the coal company
and directing the circuit court to grant a preliminary injunction to abate the
dust nuisance, the court has entered into a new area of tort law that could have
significant ramifications.56
Camden P. Siegrist
52 Id. at 71 (syl. pt. 3).
3' 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz held that punitive damages may be recovered only when the
defendant knew the reported information was false or had a reckless disregard for the truth. 418
U.S. 323, 348-50.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 566 (1977) states, "A defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if
it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion."
5 285 S.E.2d 670 (W. Va. 1981).
For a thorough discussion of West, see Comment, West v. National Mines: Creation of




Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
